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Evidence - Burden of Proof - Presumption of Innocence

The subcommittee of the House of Representatives Un-American
Activities Committee issued a subpoena directing the executive secretary of an organization to produce organization records. The executive
secretary did not produce the records and did not even suggest to
the subcommittee any reason why he could not produce them.
D, the executive secretary, was convicted of criminal contempt upon
indictment for violating 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1938) for his refusal to comply with the subpoena. The Supreme Court held that evidence of subcommittee's reasonable basis for believing that the executive secretary
could produce the records, coupled with evidence of his failure even
to suggest to the subcommittee his inability to do so, established a
prima facie case of willful failure to comply with subpoena, that burden then shifted to executive secretary to present some evidence to explain or justify his refusal, and that, when he elected not to present
any evidence, the court properly charged jury that records called for
by subpoena were in existence and under executive secretary's control at time the subpoena was served upon him. McPhaul v. United
States, 81 Sup. Ct. 138 (1960).
Is the majority opinion in this five-to-four decision of the Court
in accord with accepted and settled procedural concepts, particularly
with reference to the rules of evidence and more particularly with
reference to the burden of proof?
Before proceeding with a discussion of the problem, some definitions and distinctions are warranted. A most succinct definition of
the two meanings of the phrase "burden of proof" is found in Sellers v.
Kincaid, 303 Ill. 216, 135 N.E. 429 (1922). In this civil case,
the clear distinction is made between (1) the duty of producing
evidence as the case progresses, and (2) the duty to establish the
truth of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Although
the former may pass from party to party, the latter rests throughout
upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue. One able
writer, McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 307 (1954), explains the former
as the burden of producing evidence and the latter as the burden
of persuasion. This same writer points out that one of the obvious
determining characteristics between the two meanings of burden of
proof is that the burden of producing evidence may shift, while the
burden of persuasion never shifts. The latter, in fact, never has
occasion to shift, since it does not come into play until near the end
of the trial, when the judge charges the jury. Also, it must be
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noted that in a criminal trial, such as the principal case, the measure
of persuasion required for conviction is beyond a reasonable doubt,
as distinguished from the civil trial requirement of a preponderance
of the evidence. State v. Kearns, 47 W. Va. 266, 34 S.E. 734
(1899); McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE §§ 320-321 (1954). Another
pertinent rule is that in criminal contempt prosecutions the rules
of evidence as employed in criminal trials apply. State ex rel.
Hoosier Eng. Co. v. Thornton, 137 W. Va. 230, 72 S.E.2d 203
(1952).
To grasp the significance of the McPhaul decision, one must
understand the function that a presumption performs during a trial.
Briefly described, a presumption is a judicial implement employed
by courts to shift the burden of coming forth with or producing
evidence in an effort to obtain facts essential to a proper decision.
See 20 AM. JuR. Evidence §§ 157-166 (1939).
In criminal trials, the presumption of innocence (which must
be distinguished from the true presumption described above) plays
a major role. This somewhat nebulous but firmly fixed concept
serves two purposes: (1) to place the burden of producing evidence
of guilt upon the prosecution, and (2) to require the burden of persuasion of defendant's guilt to be established beyond a reasonable
doubt. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 309 (1954). See also 9 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940).
A presumption is created when sufficient evidence is admitted
during a trial, from which, if accepted as true, an inference may be
drawn that other facts by experience must be true. MORGAN, SOME
PROBLEMS OF PROOF 72 (1956). Therefore, in a criminal trial when
the prosecution has carried its burden of producing evidence, as
required by the presumption of innocence, resulting in a prima facie
case, an adverse presumption arises against the defendant. The burden
of producing evidence then shifts to the defendant to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This is particularly true where the
negation is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. Rossi
v. United States, 289 U.S. 89 (1933).
In considering the preceding principles as they apply upon the
failure of one to produce books and papers after due notice has
been given, the presumption arises that these books and papers would
prove to be adverse to the party refusing to produce them. Lewis
PrichardCharity Fund v. Mankin Invest. Co., 118 W. Va. 134, 189
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S.E. 96 (1936). In a case similar to the McPhaul situation, wherein
the defendant was being prosecuted for willful failure to produce papers under subpoena, the burden was on the defendant to prove excusing circumstance, if any. United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S.
349 (1950).
Now, a practical justification of the majority opinion in the
principal case may be established. When the evidence of the subcommittee's reasonable basis for believing that D could produce
records was admitted to trial along with evidence of D's failure to
even suggest his inability to produce them, a presumption that D
could produce the records arose which shifted to him the burden
of producing evidence to justify his refusal. In view of the principles and authorities above cited, this procedure would seem to
be warranted and fundamentally sound.
Although it may appear that the minority opinion is saying
that the burden of persuasion shifted, a more discerning study shows
that the minority merely disagrees with the amount of evidence required to create a presumption which will cause the burden of producing evidence to shift. More explicitly, the minority apparently
did not believe that the prosecution had introduced enough evidence
to overcome the presumption of innocence as this phrase applies to
the burden of going forward with the evidence. The minority placed
great emphasis upon the fact that the majority cited United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950), wherein the defendant was concededly
the executive secretary of the organization and had custody of its
records, while in the principal case neither of those facts was proven.
The minority, no doubt, was correct in believing that those facts
were not proven, but to hold that those facts must be proved before a presumption can arise which will shift the burden of producing evidence would be to misunderstand how a presumption is
created and its practical utility. The judge determines when there
are sufficient facts to raise a presumption, thereby allocating upon
which party the burden of going forward with the evidence rests.
See MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 72, 73 (1956). Hence,
since the majority of the Court in the McPhaul case was convinced
that sufficient evidence existed to create an adverse presumption
against D without the proof that D was actually the executive secretary and had the records in his control, this result would not seem
to be open to question.
While there may have been less evidence required to shift the
burden of producing evidence in the McPhaul case, as compared
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with prior cases, this fact alone does not even closely approach a
justification for the minority criticism that the Court dispensed with
the safeguard of the presumption of innocence, since (1) the presumption of innocence as it applies to the burden of persuasion was not
under consideration by the Court at the time, and (2) the presumption of innocence as it applies to the burden of producing evidence
was sufficiently assured to the satisfaction of the majority of the
Court. No other requirements are necessary to preserve the safeguard.
Although the dissent in the instant McPhaul case asserts that
the Court is departing from accepted procedure and is taking a
backward step, careful analysis of the decision does not substantiate
the broad assertions. The minority opinion is helpful to focus sharply
the issues involved, but the majority opinion appears to restate and
reaffirm settled principles of law practically applied in a modem
setting.
Esdel Beane Yost
Income Tax - Payment by Sublessee for Cancellation of
Lessee's Interest
A sublessee, desiring to deal directly with the owner of real
property, paid a sum of money to the lessee in consideration of the
lessee's right and interest under the lease. The Tax Court considered
the sum received by the lessee as ordinary income. Held, reversed.
It is not the person of the payor which controls the nature of the
transaction. Rather, it is the fact that the transaction constituted
a bona fide transfer of the entire leasehold interest, not merely a
liquidation of a right to future income. Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
At present, there is little problem in determining the tax treatment resulting when only the lessor and lessee are involved in the
situation. Rev. Rul. 56-531, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 983. Payment
by the lessee to the lessor in order to absolve the lessee of his contractual obligation is nothing more than the relinquishment of the
right to future rentals and is taxable at the ordinary rates. Hort v.
Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). Conversely, payment by the
lessor to the lessee in consideration of the lessee's surrendering his
leasehold interests in the real property is ordinarily considered to
constitute proceeds from the sale of capital assets receiving the
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